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ABSTRACT
Modern portfolio theory states that investments with greater beta, a common
measure of risk, require greater returns from investors in order to compensate them for
taking greater risk. Therefore, under the premise that market participants act rationally
and therefore markets run efficiently, investments with higher beta should generate
higher returns vis-à-vis investments with lower beta over the long run. In fact, many
studies suggest that investments with lower beta actually generate equal to or higher
returns relative to investments with higher beta. In looking at data for the S&P 500 going
back 22 years between 1990 and 2012, this study found that there was very low
correlation between beta and returns. In fact, portfolios with very low risk generated
commensurate to better returns versus portfolios with very high beta. Therefore, we find
that beta appears to be a poor measure of risk as it relates to the stock market.

In addition to beta and returns, this study looked at the fundamental
characteristics of each company specifically corporate profitability and balance sheet
leverage which are commonly used by investors in assessing the underlying quality of a
company. We find that companies with higher levels of return on equity combined with
lower levels of balance sheet leverage tend to outperform companies with lower levels of
ii

profitability and higher balance sheet leverage. As a result, we find a high correlation
between balance sheet leverage, ROE and stock returns. This paper suggests that in fact,
fundamental factors such as leverage and ROE tend to be better measures of risk vis-à-vis
beta. One important final observation is the fact that while in general, companies with
high ROEs and low leverage tend to outperform companies with low profitability and
high leverage, portfolios of those companies with the highest ROE and lowest leverage
and portfolios of those companies with the lowest ROE and highest leverage actually
underperform on the whole other portfolios. In other words, portfolios of companies that
exhibit the most extreme of characteristics in terms of ROE and leverage underperform
portfolios of companies with more moderate characteristics.

One plausible explanation for these observations is rooted in behavioral economic theory
known as the favorite long shot bias and the opposite favorite long shot bias. The
opposite favorite long shot bias suggests that market participants tend to “over-bet” an
asset and/or an investment with high probability of a payoff but low overall return if the
payoff occurs (ie the sure bet). In fact, market participants go so far to secure a payoff
that they actually place a higher bet on the probability of success than the actual odds
would suggest. In stock market terms, investors will tend to over-value the least-riskiest
stocks to the point where risk and return is no longer favorable. Similar phenomenon can
be observed in horse race betting and sports drafts. The favorite long shot bias is the
inverse of the opposite favorite longshot bias. This theory suggests that market
participants actually “over bet” an asset and/or an investment with the lowest probability
iii

of a payoff but with significant overall returns if the payoff occurs. Similar phenomenon
takes place in the purchase of insurance to insure against large potential losses with small
probabilities as well as lottery ticket purchases.

We see the most striking evidence of this when looking at the returns of stocks
with the highest ROEs and the lowest levels of debt/capital as of 1990. In that year,
investors would have based their investments in stocks using current attributes at that
time. We can see that stocks with the highest ROEs and lowest levels of debt/capital
garner higher valuations relative to the broad stock market. We also see that stocks with
the lowest ROEs and highest debt/capital also command premium valuations to the
market as a whole. Therefore, risk-averse investors will tend to overvalue companies
with the least risky prospects while risk loving investors will tend to overvalue
companies with the riskiest prospects at the same time. As a result, we can see from
looking at the future returns that companies that exhibit extreme characteristics in terms
of ROE and debt/capital tend to underperform the broad market. Similar to high profile
athletes and horse track betting, we find that investors tend to over-bet sure shot
investments while simultaneously over-betting long shot investments.
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EXAMINING THE CAPITAL ASSET PRICING MODEL
Modern portfolio theory suggests that an asset’s returns relative to other assets or
asset classes should be commensurate with the risks an investor assumes when investing
in that asset relative to the risks of investing in other assets or asset classes. The Capital
Asset Pricing Model (CAPM) is the most commonly used model in defining an assets
expected returns relative to an asset’s respective risks. This simple model initially
derived to help explain individual stock returns and portfolios of stocks was first
introduced by Jack Treynor, William Sharpe, John Lintner and Jan Mossin in the early
Figure 1

CAPITAL ASSET PRICING MODEL (CAPM)
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1960s and was built on the back of Harry Markowitz’s work on modern portfolio
theory and diversification often called the “mean-variance model” used for predicting a
portfolio’s future returns. This model is widely used in applications such as estimating
the cost of capital for firms and evaluating the performance of managed portfolios. The
attraction of the Capital Asset Pricing Model is that it offers pleasing and simple
predictions about how to measure risk and the relationship between expected return and
idiosyncratic risk. Under CAPM, volatility and risk are measured by a stock’s beta versus
a stock market benchmark such as the S&P 500 Index. For example, a stock that moves
two or three times more in magnitude than the direction of the S&P 500 on a daily basis
over a certain period of time is considered to hold higher beta and therefore has higher
volatility than a stock that moves in-line with magnitude of the S&P 500 on a daily basis
or over the same time horizon. The Capital Asset Pricing Model looks at an asset’s
expected return as a function of that asset’s beta relative to the beta of some benchmark
index plus the risk free rate of return available to investors in the marketplace. For
example, a stock with a beta of 1.5x relative to the S&P 500 in an environment where the
risk free rate of return on US government securities is 5% and the average return on the
market is 8% would yield an expected return of 9.5% [Equation: Expected Return = Risk
Free rate + Beta (S&P 500 return – Risk Free Rate of Return or 5% + 1.5 (8%-5%) =
9.5%]. The basic idea is that a stock with higher volatility relative to the broader stock
market should compensate investors with higher relative returns versus the stock market
over a long period of time relative to a stock with lower volatility versus the broader
market.

As a rational investor, why take higher risk if one isn’t compensated with
2

higher returns? As a result of incurring this higher volatility, an investor should expect
higher returns over time.
Before going further, it is important to understand and define what beta actually
represents.

Beta is calculated using regression analysis over a specified time frame and

is measured relative to an index. In most cases, stock price beta is measured relative to
the S&P 500 which is the most commonly used proxy for the market as a whole. Stocks
with a beta greater than 1 have greater volatility than the overall market. Stocks with a
beta equal to 1 have similar volatility to the market as a whole and stocks with a beta of
less than 1 have lower volatility relative to the market. Statistically, the beta of an
investment measures how it co-varies with the market portfolio, in the case the S&P 500.
In other words, beta measures the correlated volatility of an asset relative to the volatility
of an underlying benchmark or how an asset co-varies relative to its benchmark or a
chosen benchmark.

Since beta is measured relative to a market index, the risk

surrounding beta is often called non-diversifiable risk. Non-Diversifiable risk the risk an
investor assumes which cannot be mitigated at all, often called market risk. This is the
part of an asset’s statistical variance that cannot be removed by the diversification
provided by a portfolio of many risk assets. Diversifiable risk, on the other hand, is risk
that can be mitigated, but not necessarily eliminated, by investing across different
companies in different sectors across different asset classes and different geographies.
The point here is to minimize the risk of huge loss from taking the whole risk against one
or a few companies, sectors, assets and countries.
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Unfortunately, the empirical record of the Capital Asset Pricing Model is poor.
Recent studies on high and low volatility portfolios suggest just the opposite in that highbeta high volatility stocks actually underperform low-beta low volatility stocks over the
long term. This has been called the Low Volatility Anomaly in that the fact that
investors can earn higher returns while taking lower risk challenges modern portfolio
theory and rational expectations assumptions. In the words of Harin de Silva, investors
are getting a “Free Lunch” by generating excess returns to the market while taking lower
risks than portfolio theory suggests. This is an important observation and a profound
departure from Efficient Market Theory, also dubbed Random Walk Theory by Burton G
Malkiel in his popular book “A Random Walk Down Wall Street.” Random Walk theory
suggests that the market disseminates all information and salient news on stocks quickly
and accurately in terms of its impact on a stock’s intrinsic value. By definition, intrinsic
value refers to the actual value of a company or an asset based on an underlying
perception of its true value in terms of both tangible and intangible factors. This value
may or may not be the same as the current market value as determined by the market.
According to Malkiel, a company’s intrinsic value will be fully reflected in its stock price
with respect to risk and return leaving investors little excess profits over the broad
market. Thus, over the long run active investors cannot beat aggregate stock market
returns given markets are believed to be perfectly efficient (Malkiel 53). The major
assumption here is that all investors, who are basically constituents of the market, act
rationally in terms of how they process information about stocks and that all investors are
risk averse in terms of looking for the best risk-return tradeoff based on available
4

investment opportunities. In fact, as Nate Silver reflects in his book, The Signal and the
Noise,
“The efficient-market hypothesis is intrinsically somewhat self-defeating. If all
investors believed the theory – that they can’t make any money from trading since
the stock market is unbeatable – there would be no one left to make trades and
therefore no market at all.” (Silver 156)

In other words, the fact that there are markets and investors that constitute markets
suggests that profit opportunities exist and that the movements and trends that underlie
markets are subject to the same rational and irrational decisions made by the collective
actions of individual investors every day. Along these lines, the idea that low volatility
low beta stocks actually outperform high volatility high beta stocks suggests that the
relationship between risk and reward is not perfectly linear as Modern Portfolio Theory
would suggest but that investors’ marginal aversion to risk may in fact change as an
investor assumes more or less risk.

A number of studies have looked at the low volatility anomaly in great depth to
try to understand whether in fact the anomaly exists and whether this low volatility
anomaly could be influenced by other factors such as country bias, size effect, value
versus momentum strategies, etc. In the 1970s, Black, Jensen and Scholes and Robert A.
Haugen and A. James Heins found that the relationship between risk and return was
flatter than those predicted by the Capital Asset Pricing Model. Haugen and Heins
constructed sample portfolios from stocks selected from those listed on the New York
Stock Exchange from 1926 to 1971. Each portfolio consisted of 25 stocks for a total of
5

114 portfolios. No attempts were made to prescreen the stocks to assure their survival
over the period observed so that survivorship bias was eliminated. From the relative
monthly performance for the 114 portfolios, they calculated geometric mean returns and
Figure 2

CAPITAL ASSET PRICING MODEL – Expected vs. Actual (dashed line)

standard deviation of the monthly returns over the entire 46-year period and nine shorter
periods of five years. Based on their results, they concluded that in fact no risk premium
exists for risking taking in the stock market and therefore that the conventional
hypothesis that risk, systematic or otherwise, generates a special reward was not observed
in their results. (Heins, Haugen, James 9) In other words, as investors assumed higher
risk their return profile did not improve enough to compensate them for the additional
risk taken as predicted by CAPM. The traditional Capital Asset Pricing Model suggests a
6

linear straight line starting from the risk free rate of rate with zero-beta running up and to
the right suggesting that expected stock returns improve as beta increases. If actual stock
returns were lower than those expected by CAPM, then this would suggest that either
investors place a greater than necessary penalty on stocks which exhibit higher volatility
or that investors tend to overestimate the returns on high beta stocks and/or underestimate
the returns on low beta stocks which would violate rational expectations, a key
assumption in the CAPM.

Haugen and Heins went so far as to suggest that CAPM is not just flatter than
predicted but actually inverted in their shorter 5 year sample periods suggesting that
investors could actually make positive returns by investing in low risk stocks while
generating negative returns in high risk stocks such that not only were investors penalized
for taking greater risk but they were actually rewarded for taking lower risk during that
sample period. (Heins, Haugen, James 9) In 1992, Eugene Fama and Kenneth French
looked at data from 1941 through 1990 suggesting a similar flat CAPM curve relative to
expectations. According to Fama and French, regression models used to test CAPM have
consistently shown that the coefficient on beta is less than the average excess market
return which in this case is proxied as the average return on a portfolio of US common
stocks minus the Treasury bill rate. (French, Fama 53)

The intercepts in time series regressions of excess asset returns and the excess
market return are positive for assets with low betas and negative for assets with high
7

betas.

In fact, based on Fama and French’s work, the predicted return on the portfolio

with the lowest beta is 8.3% per year while the actual return is 11.1%. The predicted
return on the portfolio with the highest beta is 16.8% per year while the actual return is
13.7%. Fama and French concluded that the variation in expected return is unrelated to
market beta and went so far as to suggest that ratios such as book value to market equity,
earnings to price ratios and earnings to cash flow ratios actually do a better job of
explaining stock returns than beta and CAPM. (French, Fama 53) More recently,
Clark, de Silva and Thorley looked at minimum variance portfolios between 1968 and
2005. Based on the 1,000 largest US stocks over that period, the authors found that
minimum variance (i.e. those with the lowest beta relative to the market) portfolios
achieved a volatility reduction of 25% relative to the broader stock market while
delivering comparable, or even higher, average returns over that time noting that low
volatility actually produced commensurate better returns than an equivalent size portfolio
of high volatility stocks.

In fact, the average monthly returns for the lowest volatility

portfolio were ~1% between 1968 and 2005 while the average monthly standard
deviation was ~3.7%. This, according to the authors, was in stark contrast to the highest
volatility portfolio which generated monthly average returns of ~0.8% with an average
monthly standard deviation of ~8.8%. Furthermore, the 2nd quintile portfolio in terms of
lowest volatility carried similar monthly returns to the lowest volatility portfolios but
with 33% greater average monthly volatility. The 3rd and 4th quintile portfolios also
generated similar average monthly returns but with 50% and 85% greater average
monthly standard deviation respectively. Therefore, the authors found that there was no
8

return premium for assuming higher risk as predicted by CAPM (Clark, de Silva Thorley
43). In addition, in 2006 Andrew Ang, Robert J. Hodrick, Yuhang Xing and Xiaoyan
Zhang looked at stocks across 23 developed markets and the difference in average returns
between extreme quintile portfolios sorted by idiosyncratic volatility. The study
controlled for factors including world market, size and value factors and ruled out
explanations such as trading frictions, information dissemination and higher moments.
They concluded that stocks with recent past high idiosyncratic volatility tend to have
much lower returns than stocks with recent past low volatility with respect to local,
regional and world stock markets.

In their results, there was a statistically significant

difference between the returns of the highest and lowest quintile portfolios when sorted
by volatility. (Ang, Hodrick, Xing, Zhang 23) In addition, in 2007 David Blitz and Pam
van Vliet looked at the alpha spread of low versus high volatility portfolios on a global
basis and concluded that the lowest decile volatility portfolios outperformed the highest
decile volatility portfolios by 12% between 1986 and 2006. Similar to Ang, Hodrick,
Xing and Zhang, this study controlled for geography, size bias and strategy bias (i.e.
value versus growth or value versus momentum) and concluded that low volatility
portfolios still outperformed high volatility portfolios in a statistically significant manner.
Their results showed that the difference in absolute returns between top and bottom
decile volatility portfolios was 5.9%. Interestingly, the authors noted that while low
volatility portfolios underperformed high volatility portfolios in months with positive
market returns and outperformed high volatility portfolios in months with negative
market returns, the amount by which low volatility portfolios underperformed in up
9

market months was much less than the amount by which they outperformed in down
market months. Furthermore, when controlling for size and value effects, their studies
suggested that about one third of the alpha spread disappeared but still low volatility
portfolios outperformed high volatility portfolios by 8.1% and this positive alpha spread
was consistent across all geographies. (Blitz, Van Vliet 102-113)

In a separate study conducted in August 2012 by the S&P Dow Jones Indices,
Aye M. Soe, Director of Index Research & Design suggests that the “low volatility
effect” challenges traditional equilibrium asset pricing theory (CAPM) that higher risk
securities should be rewarded with higher expected returns while lower-risk assets
receive lower returns over a sufficient period of time. According to Aye’s research, over
a 10-year period of time end on March 31, 2012, the S&P 500 Low Volatility Index
returned 6.95% with 10.75% standard deviation while the Minimum Volatility Index
returned 5.1% with 12.32% standard deviation. Both of these relatively low volatility
indexes generated superior returns to the broader S&P 500 Index that returned 4.12%
with 15.99% standard deviation. In other words, by investing in a basket of low-risk risk
stocks as defined by their implied beta to the market, an investor can generate 24% to
68% higher returns while assuming 23% to 34% lower volatility. In addition, there was
no market capitalization bias in Aye’s study. In looking at large, medium and small size
companies, over a medium to long term time horizon, the low volatility is indeed present
across all three attributes although the low volatility effect is strongest and most evident
across the large capitalization categories and weakest across the smaller market
10

capitalization category. In addition, Aye’s research suggested asymmetric returns across
low-volatility strategies in their ability to capture up and downside returns. Similar to
Blitz and Vliet, Aye observed that low volatility strategies tend to underperform high
volatility strategies when markets are trending upwards and outperform high volatility
strategies when markets are trending downwards. Importantly, though, low volatility
strategies underperformed less in upward trending markets than they outperformed in
downward trending markets.

Low volatility strategies underperformed by

approximately 0.55% to 1.7% during up market periods depending on market
capitalization but outperformed by 1.4% and 2.5% during down markets. On average,
low-volatility strategies outperformed their respective market benchmarks in 47-50% of
the months studied but low-volatility strategies outperformed less frequently when the
market trended upward and outperformed markets approximately 73% to 87% of the
times when market returns were negative. This asymmetric response to market
movement highlights the ability of low-volatility strategies to provide downside
protection in uncertain times. Taken together, low volatility strategies possess
asymmetric risk-return profiles in that they outperform more frequently and with larger
magnitude when the market is trending down. (Soe 5)
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THE EMPIRICAL EVIDENCE SURROUNDING CAPM AND BETA
The purpose of this study is to look at the S&P 500 returns over a sufficiently
long period of time in order to determine whether this low volatility effect has held and
what other distinctions we can draw between high and low volatility portfolios in
addition to other aspects of stocks that may influence returns versus simply volatility.
Specifically, I took the individual constituents of the Standard & Poor’s 500 Index over a
period of 22 years beginning from 1990 and ending in 2012. The Standard & Poor’s 500
is an equity index most commonly used as a benchmark proxy for investment managers.
The Standard and Poor’s index is a free-float capitalization-weighted index based on the
common stock prices of 500 US companies. The index consists of both value stocks and
growth stocks and in general has a bias towards companies with larger market
capitalizations. The constituents of the S&P 500 are selected by committee that select
those companies to be included in the index which deemed most representative of the
industries in the US economy. Of the 500 companies in the S&P500, 319 or 60% of the
members of the index were publicly traded or consistently included in the index over the
22-year period from 1990 through 2012. Therefore, the other 181 companies were
excluded from the sample so that measures of beta and returns were comparable over a
consistent time frame and through the same market ups and downs.
12

Looking at stock price returns for the constituents of the S&P 500 relative to their
respective beta over the course of 22 years reveals that there’s little to no positive
correlation between a stock’s historic beta and that stock’s equity returns over the same
time frame.

In fact, the average correlation between stock price returns and beta is -0.07

over the 22 year history for the 319 stocks in this sample.
Figure 3: Source Bloomberg and Factset

This suggests that higher risk as measured by beta and stock price volatility does not
generate better returns for investors measured over a sufficiently long period of time that
is consistent with the academic literature that challenges beta as a predictive indicator of
future returns. In fact, according to the empirical data, we start to see diminishing
improvement in returns as beta rises to the point where not only are investors assuming
greater risk without being sufficiently compensated but in fact investors are being
penalized through poorer returns as beta rises. This is also consistent with Fama and
13

French’s conclusion that the actual CAPM line is flatter than that assumed by Markowitz
and early proponents of CAPM suggesting a non-linear relationship between higher risk
and higher returns.

What’s even more interesting from the empirical data is that investors can actually
generate higher returns with the same level or even a lower level of stock price volatility
over this same 22-year period of time that is consistent with studies around the low
volatility effect.
Figure 4: Source Bloomberg and Factset

In the above chart, the constituents of the S&P have been sorted and ranked by highest to
lowest stock price returns over 22 years. These constituents have then been grouped into
10 separate portfolios of equally weighted proportions consisting of roughly 32
companies in each portfolio. These portfolios are plotted from left to right with the
portfolios on the far left representing the highest returning stocks while those on the far
14

right represent the lowest returning stocks. The results of this study are fascinating. The
best and worst performing portfolios over the past 22 years also have the lowest and
highest beta respectively over the same time frame. In fact, the best performing portfolio
had an overall beta of 0.97 which is below the average beta of the market at 1.0x. In
other words, investors can actually earn outsized returns while investing in stocks with
lower relative beta. This supports the thesis that in fact higher risk does not generate
higher relative returns that is in violation of modern portfolio theory. One of the more
interesting observations from this study show that while the lowest beta portfolio clearly
Figure 5: Source Bloomberg and Factset
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outperformed the S&P 500 and most other portfolios between 1990 and 2012, the best
performing portfolio actually had the 5th highest beta of all of the portfolios in the
sample. In addition, the portfolio with the 8th highest beta of the 10 portfolios had the 3rd
best returns over 22 years. This seems to suggest that while low beta investment
15

strategies do generally outperform higher beta investment strategies, extremely high beta
portfolios actually do relatively well over a long period of time. This suggests that while
investors clearly gravitate towards companies with very low beta, they conversely also
seem to gravitate towards companies with very high beta simultaneously.

This may be

evidence of what’s known as the longshot favorite and opposite longshot favorite bias in
motion at the same time. This phenomenon will be discussed later in this paper.

In 2011, Andrea Frazzi and Lasse H. Pederson conducted one of the more
interesting studies surrounding the relationship between beta and stock price returns.
Their study incorporated an investment model that looked at strategies that leverage and
purchase low beta stocks while simultaneously short selling high beta stocks over a
period of 83 years between 1927 and 2009 for US equities.

16

Figure 6: Frazzini and Pederson

In 58 of those 83 years, 70% of the time, their strategy delivered positive returns.
Frazzini and Pedersen also looked at International Equities over a period of 22 years
between 1987 and 2009. In 16 of those 22 years, 72% of the time, their strategy
delivered positive returns, 2 of those 22 years produced flat returns and 4 of the 22 years
produced negative returns. Interestingly their study extended beyond equities into US
treasury bonds, US credit indices and US corporate bonds. In each of these cases, their
strategy of purchasing low beta securities while short selling high beta securities led to an
outperformance 80% of the time, 81% of the time and 65% of the time respectively.
17

They concluded that stocks with high beta have been found to deliver low risk-adjusted
returns versus stocks with low beta. (Pedersen, Frazzini, Lasse 40) This clearly
challenged the basic premise of the capital asset pricing model in that all agents invest in
the portfolio with the highest expected return per unit of risk.

The academic research alongside empirical data suggests that beta may not be a
good measure of risk in gauging stocks and stock returns. There are some embedded
problems with beta as a determination of the risk of an investment. First of all, beta is
calculated using regression models over a historical time period. This implicitly means
beta is backward looking and history may not always be an accurate predictor of the
future. In addition, beta doesn’t account for changes that are in the works such as a new
line of business, divestment of a business or businesses or industry shifts such as
consolidation or fragmentation. Finally, beta only measures overall volatility relative to
the market rather than a specific direction. For example, in an upward trending market, a
stock that is outperforming the whole market will have a beta greater than 1. In this
case, a stock is considered higher risk but in fact could simply be a function of strong
overall fundamentals. Therefore, it may be necessary to find an alternative measure of
risk when assessing the low volatility anomaly.

18

FINDING OTHER MEASUREMENTS FOR STOCK RISK
From our analysis of beta versus stock price returns, we can conclude that beta
has little to no relationship to long term stock price returns and therefore assuming higher
risk by investing in high beta stocks does not lead to above average returns over the long
term. In fact, we can argue that beta may not be a good measurement for risk and return
for stocks at all. Therefore, in order to understand why portfolios consisting of low
volatility stocks outperform portfolios consisting of high volatility stocks, we need to find
and understand where sources of risk and volatility come from. According to standard
asset pricing models, the intrinsic value of a stock is equal to the present value of
rationally expected real cash flows discounted by a fairly constant real discount rate.
Therefore, the price of stock is a function of two major inputs namely fundamental inputs
such as revenues, earnings and cash flows and more “psychological” inputs such as
discount rates which are implicitly expressed through price to earnings ratios, dividend
yields, price to cash flow ratios and market value to book value ratios that are collectively
decided by stock market investors. Fluctuations in fundamental inputs are based on
expectations of the performance of a particular company that is dependent on factors such
as a company’s market share, industry growth prospects, trends in profitability, trends in
the company’s cost structure, etc. In some cases such as operational expenses, corporate
19

strategy, investment in research & development and capital expenditures on new plant
and equipment, these factors lie within the control of the management team of that
corporation to manage and therefore investors place their faith and confidence in the
ability of a company and its management to show consistent trends in revenues and
earnings into the future. Importantly, professional industry analysts employed by wallstreet investment banks and independent research firms that tend to be closely followed
by individual investors and professional money managers generally establish projections
and expectations of a company’s earnings prospects. There is considerable evidence to
suggest that analyst forecasts and recommendations have a meaningful impact on stock
prices. According to Kent Womack, an analysis of new buy and sell recommendations of
stocks by security analysts at major US brokerage firms shows significant, systematic
discrepancies between pre-recommendation prices and eventual values. According to
Womack’s empirical evidence, for buy recommendations the average price increase after
the recommendation is made is +2.4% while for sell recommendations, the average stock
price decline after recommendation is -9.1%. (Womack 30)

In a separate study

conducted in 2001 by Brad Barber, Reuven Lehavy, Maureen McNichols and Brett
Trueman using stock prices from 1986 to 1996, concluded that an investor with a
portfolio of stocks with the most favorable consensus analyst recommendations would
have generated an average annual abnormal gross return of +4.13% after controlling for
market risk, corporation size, book-to-market multiples and price momentum effects. In
fact, holding a portfolio of least favorable consensus analyst recommendations over that
same time period would have returned an average of -4.91%. Stocks tend to
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underperform after analysts revise down their earnings forecasts or downgrade their
recommendation on a stock while stock exhibit strong positive abnormal returns after
analysts revise their forecasts favorably or raise their recommendation on a stock.
(Barber, Lehavy, McNichols, Trueman 32) Therefore, investors and professional money
managers tend to rely heavily on industry analysts’ projections and opinions when they
value, buy and sell a stock.

Fluctuations in “psychological” factors are much more difficult to predict and in
many cases tend to rely on factors that are outside of a corporation’s control and outside
the control of professional industry analysts. These factors include external macro
variables such as rates of inflation, risk free rates of return and perceptions of a
company’s future prospects, the stage of the business cycle, etc all of which can impact
investor perception and aversion or attraction to risk. These psychological factors are
reflected in a company’s price ratios namely dividend yield, price to earnings, price to
sales, price to book value ratio etc. For example, if we look at a hypothetical example
with two companies expected to generate a similar level of earnings per share of $1.00.
If, for example, company A displays promising future growth prospects, high levels of
profitability, dominant market share in its industry and has delivered consistent revenue
growth for a long period of time, Company A may be rewarded with a higher price to
earnings ratio of perhaps 15.0x. This implies that company A should trade at a stock
price of $15 (15 x $1.00 per share). If, in contrast, company B’s prospects prove to be
more cyclical and therefore less stable in an industry with low growth prospects, heavy
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competition and low levels of profitability, investors may only place a price to earnings
ratio of say 10.0x on Company B’s stock price implying a price of $10 per share.
Therefore, despite similar levels of earnings, company A’s stock price and future
earnings will trade at a 33% higher premium to company B simply because investors
perceive company A’s earnings to be more predictable and therefore more valuable than
that of company B’s earnings. Importantly, these multiples are based solely on investor
perception of value. This higher valuation in Company A’s stock price is reflective of a
lower equity risk premium imposed by investors relative to that of Company B’s stock
price. In this example, if Company A’s stock price trades at 15.0x its earnings, that
implies a 7% earnings yield (1/15) versus Company B’s earnings yield of 10%.
Therefore, investors place a 300 basis point greater discount on Company B’s earnings
due to their lack of confidence in Company B’s prospects relative to Company A.
Fluctuations in stock price multiples can have a significant impact on stock prices. In
fact, Robert Shiller’s work in 1981 on stock price volatility versus cash flow volatility
suggests that most of a company’s stock price fluctuation can be explained through
fluctuations in a company’s discount rate or implied equity risk premium rather than
volatility in underlying cash flows and dividends. According to Shiller, measures of
stock price volatility over the past century appear to be far too high – five to thirteen
times too high – to be attributed to new information about future real dividends. In fact,
the standard deviation of annual changes in real stock prices is over five times higher
than the observed variability in real dividends. Shiller goes on to say that these
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movements in stock prices may be a function of changes in investor uncertainty with
respect to a company’s dividend distribution or dividend growth path or both (Shiller 24).

Therefore, the two major sources of volatility in stock price movements comes
from changes in investor’s perception about a company’s future prospects and confidence
in those prospects as well as fundamental changes in professional analysts’ forecasts
about a company’s earnings and future earnings prospects. Importantly, changes in
investor perceptions and confidence have more influence over a stock price than changes
in analyst forecasts but both are significant factors in producing stock price volatility.
Hence, in order to properly understand why low volatility portfolios outperform high
volatility portfolios, we need to understand what influences investor expectations in
addition to factors that can influence analysts’ forecasts about a company’s prospects.

One explanation for how analysts and investors can misperceive a company’s
future prospects lies in the underlying fundamental factors that make up individual
companies namely leverage and profitability. In other words, companies with high
leverage and low levels of profitability will tend to see greater variability in earnings and
cash flows in weaker economic times relative to companies with low levels of leverage
and high levels of profitability. This is because small changes in revenues for companies
highly levered and operating on thin margins can have much larger impacts on earnings
and cash flows versus companies with low leverage and high margins. For example,
imagine two difference companies, Company A and Company B, in the same industry
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with the same corporate tax rate and revenue prospects. Company A has $100 in
revenues, $50 in fixed expenses and no interest expenses. Company B has the same $100
in revenues, $70 in fixed expenses and $10 in interest expenses. Therefore, Company A
generates 50% pre-tax margins while Company B generates 20% pre-tax margins. If
revenues across the industry fall by 10%, both companies will see their revenues decline
from $100 to $90. In the case of Company A, its pre-tax margins will fall from 50% to
40% or a decline of 20% in terms of total pre-tax profit from $50 to $40. In the case of
Company B, its pre-tax margins will fall from 20% to 10% or a decline of 50% in terms
of total pre-tax profit from $20 to $10. Thus, Company B will be deemed to have more
earnings and cash flow volatility relative to a change in revenues versus Company A.
These differences in fundamental factors were explored in depth in a study conducted by
Chuck Joyce and Kimball Mayer at GMO LLC. The two analysts concluded that risk is a
multifaceted concept and that it is foolish to try to reduce it to a single figure like beta. In
fact, according to their work, low risk stocks are characterized by more fundamental
factors such as low levels of corporate leverage, high levels of profitability, low levels of
profit volatility and low relative beta. These types of companies are generally considered
higher quality due to their respective fundamental attributes. In looking at both US Large
Cap companies from 1965 to 2011 in addition to International equities using the standard
Morgan Stanley EAFE index (EAFE: Europe, Australia, Asia and the Far East) from
1985 to 2011, Joyce and Mayer found that low risk stock high quality stocks
overwhelming outperform high-risk low quality stocks in both the US and International
markets (Mayer, Kimball 7)
24

Figure 7: Source GMO Capital LLC

One of the more interesting pieces of evidence for high quality low beta stocks
outperforming low quality high beta stocks is in looking at the equity returns generated
by Berkshire Hathaway run by the legendary equity investor Warren Buffett. Andrea
Frazzini, David Kabiller and Lasse H. Pedersen looked at Warren Buffet’s alpha
generation over a 30-year period in order to understand where his outsized returns came
from. In finance, alpha is defined as the abnormal rate of return on a security or portfolio
in excess of what would be predicted by an equilibrium model like the capital asset
pricing model. In other words, the excess returns from an investment relative to the risks
from that investment. Frazzini, Kabiller and Pedersen identified several unique features
consistent with Warren Buffett’s portfolio one of which included buying stocks that are
safe (low beta and low volatility) and high quality meaning stocks that are profitable,
stable, growing and with high payout ratios. Between 1976 and 2011, Berkshire
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Hathaway’s publicly listed stock portfolio produced excess returns of 9.7% per year
versus the overall stock market returns of 6.1% per year while assuming an average beta
of 0.77x versus the market beta of 1.0x. (Frazzini, Kabiller, Pedersen 40) In fact, in the
Berkshire Hathaway 1989 annual report, Warrant Buffett says, “It’s far better to buy a
wonderful company at a fair price than a fair company at a wonderful price.” In Buffett’s
own words, his strategy as a stock picker has always been to focus on high quality
companies rather than trying to find bargains with low quality companies.

In looking at similar fundamental factors for companies across the 10 portfolios in
this study we can find similar conclusions with respect to stock price returns, beta and
average levels of corporate leverage and return on common shareholders’ equity. The
table above looks at the same 10 portfolios that we constructed by looking at the S&P
500 Index for the past 22 years. In addition to beta and returns, this analysis includes 22year average debt to capital ratios and the average return on common equity across the
portfolio based on the constituents of each portfolio and the average price to earnings
ratio across all stocks within each portfolio. I chose to focus on debt to capital and
return on equity (ROE) because corporate leverage is an attribute closely watched by
equity and fixed income investors as a gauge of bankruptcy risk and the ability for a
corporate to meet its debt obligations while ROE is a broad measure of a corporation’s
profitability relative to a company’s equity capital. Using the Dupont ratio, a company’s
ROE is calculated by multiplying that company’s operating margin by its asset turnover
by its leverage ratio. A company’s return on equity is a commonly used benchmark by
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investors and corporate executive in determining how well a company utilizes its total
available capital and the profitability of that company’s capital base. In this case,
operating margins are defined as a company’s total revenues less total cost of good plus
overhead operating expenses. Debt to capital is a commonly used measure by equities
analysts in analyzing the level of indebtedness a corporation has relative to the total
assets of the company. Importantly, for this analysis, only long term debt and obligations
are included as opposed to short-term debt that is usually used for working capital or
accounts payables. Most short-term liabilities are funded by short-term assets and
therefore do not represent interest expenses or long term claims against a company’s
assets.

The most interesting observation in this study is the relationship between portfolio
performance, average debt to capital ratios and average ROE. The average debt to capital
for the worst performing portfolio is nearly 9 times higher than the average debt to capital
for the top-performing portfolio. In fact, the average debt to capital for the top 5
performing portfolios in the group was 35% vs. 46% for the bottom 5 performing
portfolios in the group. In addition, the average ROE for the top five best performing
portfolios was 22.9% vs. 8.9% for the five worst performing portfolios showing much
higher returns on equity capital for the top performing portfolios relative to the five worst
performing portfolios. In fact, the top performing portfolio generated an average ROE of
38.6% and returns of 45% over the 22 year period while the portfolio with the lowest
ROE at 1.1% generated returns of just 14% over the same time period. Therefore, there
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does seem to be a strong relationship between long term shareholder returns and
fundamental factors such as debt/capital and return on equity capital. In fact, the average
compound annual growth rate for the best performing portfolio in the group was 382%
over 22 years versus flat for the worst performing portfolio. In addition, the average
compound annual growth rate for the top five best performing portfolios is 117% over a
22 year period versus just 9.2% for the five worst performing portfolios.

What’s most interesting in looking at earnings per share is the standard deviation
of earnings relative to their respective growth rates. While the top five best performing
portfolios grew at a compound annual growth rate that was five times faster than the five
worst performing portfolios, the standard deviation of earnings for the top five best
performing portfolios was half that of the five worst performing portfolios. In other
words, not only did the five worst performing portfolios show a lower rate of compound
earnings growth over the past 20 years but the volatility of those earnings were nearly
50% greater than the top five best performing portfolios. Companies with high levels of
earnings and cash flow volatility tend to be harder to predict by both analysts and
investors.

In fact in looking at risk adjusted returns across the 319 stocks from our Standard
& Poor’s 500 Index sample from 1990 to 2012 by ranking returns by beta alone, the
highest beta portfolio would have generated an average annual return of 22.1% at an
average beta of 2.25 times. In other words, the highest beta portfolio generated
28

approximately 10% return for every 1.0 unit of beta assumed. The second highest beta
portfolio would have returned an average 30.6% for a beta of
1.68 or nearly 18% return for every 1.0 unit of beta. The third highest beta portfolio
would have returned 81.9% for a beta of 1.46 or 56% return for every 1.0 unit of beta. In
fact, the 5th lowest beta portfolio generated a return of 122.7% for a beta of 1.01 or 120%
return for every unit of beta. The standout risk adjusted return portfolio is actually the
lowest beta portfolio with a 22 year compound average annual return of 79.5% for 0.34x
beta or 232% return for every unit of beta. In other words, in general an investor could
have assumed lower average beta versus the market with higher returns especially when
adjusted for the level of risk assumed.

If we then rank our universe of stocks based on fundamental factors such as
lowest to highest debt to total capital and highest ROEs, we get a strikingly different
picture. Under this analysis, the lowest debt to capital portfolio generated a total return
of 87.1% between 1990 and 2012 with an overall leverage ratio of 8.5%.
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Figure 8: Source Bloomberg and Factset
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The second lowest leverage portfolio generated a return of 82.2% (portfolio 2) with a
total overall leverage ratio of 19.1%. Interestingly, these two portfolios had an average
beta of 0.97 and 1.29 respectively which is very basically on par with the average beta of
the S&P 500 over the same time frame. In other words, higher returns versus the market
without assuming much greater risk. In contrast, the second and third highest levered
portfolios generated returns of 29.5% (portfolio 9) and 27.2% (portfolio 8) respectively.
In fact, the top five least levered portfolios generated an average return of 81.9% versus
45.1% for the top five highest levered portfolios.
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Figure 9: Source Bloomberg and Factset
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In looking at returns on equity as an additional fundamental factor, the top two portfolios
with the highest average return on equity generated returns of 38.7% and 69.9%
respectively while those portfolios with the lowest returns on equity generated returns of
34.7, 42.1% and 13.2% respectively. Here again we see a positive relationship between
profitability as measured by ROE and returns although the portfolio with the highest level
of profitability does not necessarily generate the best returns over the 22-year period, the
remaining nine portfolios show a strong positive correlation between ROE and returns.
The point here is that fundamental factors such as leverage and ROE in combination tend
to be better predictors of future returns vis-à-vis beta.

The analysis above seems to suggest that there’s a direct relationship between
debt/capital and ROE relative to overall stock price returns. In general, companies with
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lower levels of debt/capital and higher ROEs tend to perform better over time than
companies with high levels of debt/capital and low ROEs. Therefore, fundamental
factors such as leverage and return on equity appear to be better measures of risk and
therefore better predictors of future stock price returns versus a single variable such as
beta and standard deviation. While beta does a good job in assessing day to day stock
price volatility, in general beta does a poor job in forecasting future stock price returns.
This makes sense from a business perspective. ROE and debt/capital measure a
company’s fundamental characteristics. In looking at different companies across
different industries, we tend to find that over the long term, most companies have a
difficult time generating abnormally high returns on capital far and above their cost of
capital for a sustainable period of time. That’s because abnormally high levels of return
tend to entice competition to enter a market and try to compete for a slice of these high
returns. Higher competition means that returns for a company’s product or service is
likely to erode until returns stabilize to a more normal level generally commensurate with
that company’s or that industry’s cost of capital. Returns on capital generally don’t fall
below the cost of capital because companies would choose to shut their operations if
returns on capital fell below the cost of capital. Why stay in business if you’re bound to
generate economic losses? Therefore, companies that generate high ROEs over a long
term time horizon tend to be in industries with very little competition and therefore
companies have oligopolistic or monopolistic positions or companies have a
technological advantage or brand equity that is difficult for competition to replicate and
compete away or a combination of both. Either way, we see that companies with high
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ROEs tend to have abnormally unique characteristics and fundamental factors which also
tend to insulate them through the ups and downs of economic cycles. In addition,
debt/capital tends to measure a company’s total leverage which can be a good attribute in
goods economic times and a highly negative attribute during bad economic times.
Excess leverage can have a number of deleterious impacts on a company. Excess
leverage can restrict a company’s ability to invest and expand in growth projects if debt
payments consume a large portion of a company’s cash flow. This can lead to reduced
market share and limit a company’s ability to successfully compete against its peers.
Similarly, high levels of leverage can psychologically impair a management’s willingness
to take risks in developing new products or going after new markets. With an excessively
conservative management team companies can become inflexible and lose
competitiveness over time. Finally, excess leverage can amplify cash flow volatility
especially during a bad business cycle or economic cycle. In addition, if a company’s
cash flows and balance sheet come under question, creditors may demand a higher rate of
interest. Therefore, high leverage and high debt payments can actually create a vicious
cycle of deteriorating cash flow volatility led by high debt creating more cash flow
volatility as interest rates on that debt move higher.
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THE ROLE OF ANALYSTS FORECASTS IN STOCK PRICE VOLATILITY
Stock market valuation only explains part of the low volatility anomaly. As
discussed earlier, stock prices are a function of both multiples placed on earnings by
investors as well as projected fundamental prospects such as revenues, earnings and cash
flows set by professional industry analysts. Academic research has proven that
individual traders and professional money managers with respect to how a company’s
stock price is perceived by the broader market closely follow professional analysts’
projections, opinions and recommendations about stocks. In order to understand the low
volatility anomaly, we need to understand the role that a company’s fundamentals
including revenues, earnings and cash flow plays in impacting analyst’s projections about
its future prospects. More specifically, we need to understand how accurate analysts are
in projecting earnings and cash flows for publicly traded companies, what impacts and
influences these projections and most importantly how earnings predictability impacts
stock market valuations. Ilia D. Dichev and Vicki Wei Tang conducted one of the more
interesting studies on this subject. Dichev and Tang looked at a sample of 22,113
publicly traded companies and their earnings and operating cash flows between 1984 and
2004. The study looked at cash flow volatility over the 20 year time period. Companies
were then separated into quintiles based on their level of cash flow volatility. Those with
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the highest volatility were placed into the highest quintile while those with the lowest
volatility were placed into the lowest quintile. In addition, Dichev and Tang looked at
Wall Street analyst’s earnings and cash flow forecasts on both short term and long term
time horizons. The two authors make a number of important conclusions. First, short
term specifications indicate that low-volatility earnings have much higher persistence as
compared to high-volatility earnings. Beyond short-term specifications, long-run tests
indicated that earnings volatility has substantial predictive power for up to 5 years in the
future. Earnings with low volatility have remarkably high persistence and correlation
during the entire predictive horizon, while earnings with high volatility show quick
reversion to the mean and little reliable predictability (Dichev, Tang, Wei 21). This
means that companies that have low earnings and cash flow volatility in the short term
tend to show a persistently low level of future earnings volatility. This future level of
earnings persistence is even stronger when companies show low volatility over a longerterm time horizon. Thus, if a company shows low cash flow volatility over a 1-year and
5-year time horizon, there’s a strong likelihood that the same company will show low
cash flow volatility and therefore higher cash flow predictability into the future. On the
other hand, companies with high cash flow volatility are more likely to see their earnings
and cash flows mean revert to an average level over the long term and therefore show
more volatility in the short term. Therefore, earnings volatility is inversely related to
earnings predictability.
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The second important conclusion from Dichev and Tang’s study was that
companies with higher earnings volatility also tend to have larger errors in analyst’s
forecasts over a given period of time than those of companies with low earnings
volatility. These errors tend to be larger and more frequent the longer the time horizon
of the study. Based on empirical results, their study found that it is easier to predict
earnings 5 years ahead for low-volatility firms than to predict earnings 1 year ahead for
high volatility or even all firms. This suggests earnings volatility has a remarkable
differentiating power in the long-run prediction of earnings. In fact, based on their
research, the two authors found that on average analysts do not fully understand the
implications of earnings volatility for future earnings and in quantitative terms analysts
impound less than half of the full implications of earning volatility for earnings
predictability.

Additional tests revealed that the results are nearly the same for 2-year-

ahead earnings forecasts (Dichev, Tang, Wei 21).

In looking at our sample of 319 stocks from the S&P 500 between 1990 and 2012,
it’s very clear that companies with the fewest negative earnings surprises over the course
of the past 22 years outperformed those companies with the most negative earnings
surprises. For this study, a positive or negative earnings surprise is defined as differences
between analysts’ estimates for a company’s earnings on January 1st of each calendar
year and the actual company’s earnings report on December 31st of that same calendar
year. Clearly and unsurprisingly, we can see from figure 11 that companies that tend to
exceed analyst’s forecasts tend to perform better than companies that disappoint analyst
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estimates. Figure 11 looks at a company’s actual earnings in a given year relative to
analyst forecasts at the beginning of that year and the number of years between 1990 and
2012 when a company positively or negatively surprised analyst forecasts. In fact, the
highest returning portfolio between 1990 and 2012, on average, exceeded analyst
consensus forecasts 69% of the time while the worst performing portfolio negatively
surprised analyst consensus expectations 57% of the time over the same 22 year period.
Figure 10: Source Factset

Additionally, Figure 12 further supports the idea that companies with higher quality
fundamentals tend to have more stable earnings predictability and tend to generate better
returns for investors over the long run. Figure 12 shows us the relationship between
companies that most frequently report negative year-over-year earnings declines and their
respect leverage ratios (defined here as debt-to-capital) and operating margins. I’ve used
operating margins in place of ROE in this case as operating margins are a more direct
measure of year-to-year change in business conditions while ROE has multiple factors
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namely leverage, asset turnover, operating margins and tax rates. Again, we can see that
in general, companies with lower leverage and higher operating margins tend to have
fewer years with earnings declines and generally outperform over the long run. In fact,
the portfolio with the lowest debt to capital also had the fewest years with negative yearover-year earnings declines. This is most likely due to the fact that companies with high
leverage and low profitability have much higher levels of operational and financial
gearing through up and down economic cycles. In extending this study beyond just
positive and negative earnings surprises, we ranked the 10 portfolios based on companies
that reported the smallest deviation between estimated earnings forecasts and actual
earnings reports regardless of the whether the actual report was better or worse than
projected. In Figure 12, we can see, interestingly, that those companies that had the
smallest deviation between estimated earnings and actual reported earnings generally had
much lower beta than companies with large deviations from estimated versus actual
earnings. In addition, companies with the lowest deviation from estimates also generally
had much higher operating margins. This supports the idea that stocks with high
volatility generally have less earnings predictability and that earnings predictability is
partially of a function of fundamental factors such as profitability. This may be due to
the fact that companies with higher average levels of profitability and therefore generate
higher average returns on capital are generally companies with high and sustainable
market share in industries with stable and predictable end market demand. These types
of companies will have more stable earnings over the course of different economic
cycles. Overall, Figures 11 and 12 show us that analysts have a harder time predicting
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future earnings for companies with high levels of leverage and low levels of operating
margins and that consequently these same companies tend to show higher levels of
volatility over a long term time horizon due to this lack of earnings predictability, higher
frequency of earnings declines and generally higher perceived level of uncertainty and
risk.

Figure 11: Source Factset and Bloomberg
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Figure12: Source Factset
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BEHAVIORAL EXPLANATIONS FOR THE LOW VOLATILITY ANOMALY
There are a number of theories using behavioral economics as a basic framework
to attempt to explain this low volatility anomaly in stock market returns as it relates to
investor behavior. Malcolm Baker, Brendan Bradley and Jeffrey Wurgler suggested that
such behavior is reflective of investor preferences for lotteries, representativeness and
overconfidence as three reasons based on behavioral economics to explain the low risk
anomaly (Baker, Bradley, Wurgler 26). Many of these findings are grounded in research
first published by Nobel Prize winning psychologists Daniel Kahneman and Amos
Tversky in the late 1970s and more recent work conducted by Richard Thaler of the
University of Chicago. Preference for lotteries suggests that when presented with an
opportunity to win a large expected payoff combined with the prospects of a limited but
negative expected payout investors will choose to take the gamble. In other words, if
given a 50% chance of losing $100 versus a 50% chance of winning $110, most people
will choose not to gamble despite a positive expected payoff of $5 given the potential
large loss of $100. This is because of two concepts called Loss Aversion and Prospect
Theory, first defined by Kahneman and Tversky in 1979. According to Kahneman and
Tversky, loss aversion suggests that investors would shy away from volatility for fear of
realizing a loss. A gambler’s risk aversion can be defined to depend on the minimum
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probability of success that would him to accept a bet. The higher the minimum
probability he demands, the higher his risk aversion. Despite the idea that a rational
person would take the bet given the positive expected payoff, the magnitude of negative
utility from realizing a loss or the possibility of realizing a loss is much greater than the
same magnitude of positive utility from realizing a gain or the possibility of realizing a
gain. The notion that people derive greater negative utility from a loss relative to the
positive utility they would gain from a commensurate amount of profit is central to
Daniel Kahnemann’s Nobel Prizing winning work around Prospect Theory. As
Kahnemann explains, for some reason outside of the bounds of rational decision-making,
individuals place a greater “penalty” on the possibility of realizing negative utility versus
the same value of positive utility. But suppose that same individual is given a 0.12%
chance of winning $5,000 or a 99.88% chance of losing a mere $1. Again, this gamble
presents an individual with the possibility of a large and positive expected payoff but
with the possibility of a small but negative expected payout but in this case most people
will choose the gamble despite the near certainty of realizing a loss. According to
Kahneman and Tversky’s notion of Prospect Theory, this is because the magnitude of
potential negative utility is small enough that the gambler can “take the pain” of a
potential loss for the prospect of a large positive payoff (Kahneman, Tversky, Daniel 9).
This explains the amount of money spent on roulette wheels and lotteries despite having
negative expected payoffs. Carrying this illustration over to the stock market, with
individually low priced highly volatile stocks, investors perceive that they have limited
liability with a small chance of doubling or tripling in value in a short period of time and
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therefore choose to take the risk. In short, these high volatility stocks represent lottery
tickets in the mind of investors.

Another explanation cited as an explanation for the low volatility anomaly
suggests representativeness. According to Kahneman and Tversky, representativeness
takes place when people use preconceived biases and judgments to attach probabilities to
an outcome without respect to prior probabilities. If people evaluate probability by
representativeness, prior probabilities often get neglected and can lead to erroneous and
serious errors based on judgments of probability rather than mathematical facts. One
classic case study conducted by Kahneman and Tversky took place when subjects were
shown brief personality descriptions of several individuals, allegedly sampled at random
from a group of 100 professionals namely engineers and lawyers. In one experimental
condition, subjects were told that the group from which the description was drawn
consisted of 70 lawyers and 30 engineers and in another experiment subjects were told
that the group consisted of 30 lawyers and 70 engineers. After being given a description
of the individual without disclosing that person’s occupation, subjects were asked to
assess the probability that the individual was an engineer or a lawyer. Despite the odds
of a lawyer vs. engineer standing at 70:30 in the first experiment and 30:70 in the second
experiment, the subjects produced essentially the same probability judgments evaluating
the likelihood that a particular description belonged to an engineer rather than to a lawyer
by the degree to which this description was representative of the two stereotypes with
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little to no regard for prior probabilities given for the categories (Kahneman, Tversky,
Daniel 7).

As it relates to stocks, investors tend to look at high flying stocks like Apple,
Microsoft and Intel over the years and conclude that speculative high risk stocks are the
best way to make large amounts of money in the stock market while ignoring the low
probability with which such companies or stocks actually exhibit outsized returns over
the long run. In addition, according to Kahneman and Tversky, people will often exhibit
insensitivity to sample sizes when establishing judgment probabilities (Kahneman,
Tversky, Daniel 27). In other words, investors look at successful stocks like Microsoft,
Amazon and Apple and assume these companies are more often the rule rather than the
exception to the rule. In the example of Microsoft, Amazon and Apple, despite looking
at a sample size of just three, investors will tend to conclude that most technology
companies are successful stocks.

Finally, the authors Baker, Bradley and Wurgler looked at investors’
overconfidence as another explanation for the low volatility phenomenon.
Overconfidence suggests that investors place more confidence and therefore a higher
probability on an outcome with their own judgments than actual outcomes (Baker,
Bradley, Wurgler 12). According to Dale Griffin and Amos Tversky, people’s
confidence is determined by the balance of arguments for and against the competing
hypothesis, with insufficient regard for the weight of the evidence (Tversky, Griffin 24).
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In other words, people are often more confident in their judgments than is warranted by
the facts. Overconfidence is not limited to lay judgment or laboratory experiments. Dun
& Bradstreet’s well-publicized observation that more than two-thirds of small businesses
fail within 4 years suggest that many entrepreneurs overestimate their probability of
success.

One of the more interesting examples of overconfidence involves what’s often
called the Favorite Long Shot Bias. R. M. Griffith first observed the Favorite Long Shot
bias in 1949. Griffith looked 519 horse races in 1947 at the spring meets of Churchill
Downs, Belmont and Hialeah. Griffith used horse track races because in horse race
betting, the odds on the various horses in any race are a function of the proportion of the
total money that is bet on each and does therefore the house set socially determined rather
than pre-established odds. On the other hand, the objective probability for winners from
any group of horses is given a posteriori by the percentage of winners. Therefore, the
odds express (reciprocally) a psychological probability of outcomes while the percentage
winners at any odds group measures the true probability of outcomes. Griffith wanted to
understand whether there were consistent and significant discrepancies between the
psychological probabilities and the actual outcomes. From his findings, Griffith
concluded that while most of the betting pool for horse races are placed on the short odds
(the higher probability winning horse), the amount is not great enough relative to what
the actual outcomes suggest. In other words, bettors consistently wagered too much on
horses with long odds of winning and too little on horses with highly certain odds of
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winning. This suggests that investors tend to overvalue long shot bets while
undervaluing sure shot favorites. In other words, when looking at two different bets, one
with large but highly unlikely payoffs or the long shot and one with smaller but more
highly probable payoffs or the sure shot, investors will tend to bet more often on the long
shot than the odds would suggest. More specifically, the expected returns per dollar bet
increase monotonically with the probability of the horse winning. Favorites win more
often than the subjective probabilities imply and long shots less often. This means that
favorites are much better bets than long shots (Griffith 4). In 1986, Ziemba and Hausch
published studies based on over 50,000 horse track races in the State of California. In the
figure below, Ziemba and Hausch illustrates the favorite long shot bias using a simply
diagram. Expected returns per dollar bet are plotted for horses at various market odds,
using a transaction cost assumption of t=15.33%, which applies to the State of California.
The horizontal line indicates the point at which the returns are the expected 0.8467 (1-t).
This occurs at odds of about 9-2 (i.e. about a 15% probability of winning). For odds
above 18-1, there is a steep drop in the expected return, with returns falling to only 13.7%
per dollar wagered at 100-1. This means that someone were to bet on a horse with 100-1
odds, rather than winning one race in 100, that person would win only win one race in
730. For odds below 3-10, expected returns are positive with about 4-5% for the
shortest-odds horses. In fact, extreme favorites, those with odds of less than 3-10 (greater
than 70% chance of winning) actually have positive expected values (Ziemba, Hausch 4).
In one of the more interesting studies on this topic, Erik Snowberg and Justin Wolfers
(2010) looked at 6.4 million horse race starts in the United States from 1992 to 2001.
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After looking at the frequency of bets placed on horses with different odds, the authors
noted a substantial favorite long shot bias. According to the authors, “using large-scale
dataset we find evidence in favor of the view that misperceptions of probability drive the
favorite long shot bias…” Based on their studies, the rate of return to betting on horses at
long odds is much lower than the return to betting on favorites. Interestingly, their work
adjusts for risk loving utility functions versus risk neutral or risk-neutral functions in
keeping with their conclusions. They accomplish this by looking not only at the total
amount that is placed on sure shot and long shot horses relative to their expected returns
but also by segregating risk-loving bettors versus risk-neutral behavior where riskneutrality is defined as gamblers placing bets based on odds that are misperceived
relative to the actual odds offered by the horse-track. By looking at gamblers that not
only over-bet long shots but also the size of their relative bets versus risk-neutral players,
they can separate risk loving versus risk neutral gamblers and therefore test the model
under both conditions. The utility functions for risk loving and risk neutral gamblers are
then estimated from the pricing of winning bets and test for long-shot and sure-shot
behavior. In their analysis, the bias for long shots versus favorite bets exists regardless of
whether a gambler is risk loving or risk neutral. In addition, their results suggest that the
low rates of return to betting on long-shots are rationalized by bettors who bet as though
the tiny probabilities of winning actually have moderate probabilities of winning because
of misperceptions of risk rather than an affinity towards taking risk. Similar to Ziemba
and Hausch, the authors illustrate that the rate of return on win bets declines as risk
increases suggesting that bettors overestimate the returns from horses with low odds of
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Figure13: Source Ziemba and Hausch

winning races and that this overestimation of returns actually rises as the odds decline.
Figure 13 shows this in graph format. Horses are grouped according to their odds and
the rate of return to betting on every horse in each group is then calculated. The data is
graphed on a log-odds scale in order to better show the relevant range of the data, hence
the reason for the bulge in the graph at 10/1 odds. The average rate of return for betting
favorites is -5.5% while for horses at the mid-range of 3/1 to 15/1 odds yield a rate of
return of -18% while real long shots, horses at 100/1 odds or more, yield much lower
returns of -61%. The expected return from rational betting behavior is shown as the dark
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black line. Snowberg and Wolfers explain that if bettors were perfectly rational, then the
odds of a horse winning a race would more closely approximate the expected payoffs of
placing a bet. Instead, Snowberg and Wolfers found that in fact when looking at actual
betting returns that bettors lose more money on long-shot horses than one would expect
and generate fewer losses than one would expect on sure shot horses. What’s important
about horse track racing is that it incorporates pari-mutuel betting. Pari-mutuel bets are
betting systems in which all bets of a particular type are placed together in a pool and
payoff odds are calculated by sharing the pool among all winning bets. In other words,
the gamblers set the odds based on how heavily they bet on certain horses as opposed to
the “house” or the race track in this example. As an example, if $100 of bets are placed
on 3 different horses of which $50 are placed on horse 1, $30 on horse 2 and $20 on
horse 3, the payoff on horse 1 would be 1:1 or $1 in returns for every $1 bet. The payoff
odds on horse 2 would be roughly 3:1 or $3 in returns for every $1 bet and the payoff on
horse 3 would be 5:1 or $5 in returns for every $1 bet. When looking at race day results
for both standard bets and complex bets such as trifecta betting, Snowberg and Wolfers
found that bettors place greater odds on long shot bets than what actually transpires on
race day and similarly bettors place lower odds on sure shot bets relative to what actually
transpires. In fact, because overall bets are pooled, over-betting certain odds implicitly
means under-betting elsewhere with the payoff odds. In this case, under-betting takes
place amongst the higher odd horses. By placing heavier bets on long shots relative to
the expected payoff on the long shot horse, investors are “over-paying” for the long-shot
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bet. In fact, neglecting for transaction taxes, sure shot investments would generate a
slightly positive payoff (Snowberg, Wolfers, 723-746).

Richard Thaler suggests a number of factors could help explain this anomaly.
First, both of these studies suggest that bettors tend to overestimate the chances that the
long shot bets will win and as a result also underestimate the chances that favorite “sure
shot” bets will win. The fact that positive expected returns can be made by betting on
horses with higher odds and lower payoffs suggests this to be the case. In addition,
bettors might overweight the small probability of winning in calculating the utility of the
bet. In other words, bettors become so enthralled with the prospects of winning large
payoffs that they overestimate the probability that these payoffs will happen. In addition,
bettors may derive utility simply from holding a ticket on a long shot. Given the fact that
placing a wage is represents a small out of pocket expense, the prospects of a large payoff
outweigh the potential small losses that a bettor is likely to incur. Finally, bettors may
choose a bet for very irrational reasons such as a horse’s name. Such bettors can actually
drive the odds down on the worst horses, with the “smart money” simply taking the better
bets on the favorites (Thaler 74).

Russell S Sobel and Matt E. Ryan offer up two interesting explanations for the
existence of the long shot bias namely risk-preference theories and informationperception theories. The first group of theories attributes the long shot bias to a
preference for risk among gamblers. According to Sobel and Ryan, consumers have a
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globally risk-averse utility function yet over the relevant range concerning gambling and
betting, the utility function becomes locally risk loving (Sobel, Ryan 371-385). Starting
with conclusion that bettors are risk loving, Quandt in 1986 shows that because of the
additional utility derived from taking high-risk high variance bets, the payoff of such a
bet must necessarily be smaller for the high-risk long shot bet than the low-risk favorite
bet. In other words, because gamblers and bettors enjoy taking risk and derive more
utility as they take more risk, the payoffs from taking a high-risk bet should be lower than
if gamblers were equally risk averse as the general population because of the additional
unit(s) of utility a gambler receives from taking risk. The second group of theories, the
information-perception theories, places the activities of the bettor as a reaction to new
information at the time of betting as opposed to being naturally predisposed to taking
riskier bets (Quandt 7). According to Snowberg and Wolfers (2004), studies by
cognitive psychologists suggest that bettors do not perfectly absorb information and that
people are systematically poor at discerning between small and tiny probabilities hence
they price each similarly. Furthermore, certain events are strongly preferred to extremely
likely events, leading to even very likely events to be under-priced. Ultimately, it is the
representative bettor’s inability to process information correctly that leads to a favoritelong shot bias in the information-perception theories (Snowberg, Wolfers 723-746).
Daniel Kahneman, in his book “Thinking, Fast and Slow” explains that all people have
two systems for making a decision. System 1 operates automatically and quickly, with
little or no effort and no sense of voluntary control while System 2 allocates attention to
the effortful mental activities that demand it, including complex computations. The
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operations of System 2 are often associated with the subjective experience of agency,
choice and concentration. For example, when a person buys a lottery ticket, the thrilling
possibility of winning the big prizes is shared by the community and reinforced by
conversations at work and at home. Buying a ticket is immediately rewarded by pleasant
fantasies in which possibility takes over from actual probability. In this example, System
1 takes over System 2 in terms of framing the decision of whether or not to buy the
lottery ticket. In Kahneman’s recent research, emotion and vividness influence fluency,
availability and judgments of probability accounting for our excessive response to the
few rare events that we do not ignore (Kahneman 231). Benoit B Mandelbrot writes
extensively about this in his book “The (Mis) Behavior of Markets. Mandelbrot points
out that contrary to orthodoxy, stock price changes are very far from following the
standard Gaussian bell curve. If they did, one should be able to run any market’s price
records through a computer and analyze the changes and watch them fall in the
approximate “normality” assumed by Louis Bachelier’s random walk. They should
cluster about the mean, or average, of no change. In fact, the bell curve fits reality very
poorly. According to Mandelbrot, from 1916 to 2003, the daily index movements of the
Dow Jones Industrial Average do not spread out on graph paper like a simple bell curve.
The far edges flare out too high: too many big changes. Theory suggests that over that
time, there should be fifty-eight days when the Dow moved more than 3.4%; in fact, there
were 1,001. Theory predicts six days of index swings beyond 4.5%; in fact there were
366. And index swings of more than 7% should come once every 300,000 years; in fact,
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the twentieth century saw 48 such days. Therefore, according to Mandelbrot’s research,
investors tend to underestimate the risks in owning stocks (Mandelbrot 123).

In contrast to the Favorite Long shot Bias, many studies suggest a bias in the other
direction often referred to as the Opposite Long shot Bias. Linda and Bill Woodland
conducted one of the more famous studies involving the Opposite Long shot Bias in 1994
using professional baseball statistics as their data set. The analysis included 24,603
major league baseball games for between the 1979 and 1989 seasons. Woodland and
Woodland looked at the actual percentage of times the underdog team won their baseball
games relative to the odds placed on that team’s chances of winning prior to the game.
According to the Woodland team, using regression analysis and z-test scores, their
research indicated that in contrast to racetrack betting, baseball bettors over bet the
favorites rather than the underdogs. This reverse bias is even more pronounced when
heavy underdogs are excluded from consideration. According to their conclusion, this
long-standing preference of bettors to over bet favorite teams may represent true market
inefficiency because people think that betting on the favorites shows and being perceived
as more knowledgeable is more important than beating the odds (Woodland, Woodland
10). In their book “Scorecasting: The Hidden Influences Behind How Sports are Played
and Games are Won,” Tobias Moskowitz and Jon Wertheim interviewed Dallas Cowboys
executive Mike McCoy who was brought on by team owner Jerry Jones in 1991 to help
develop a strategy for drafting a winning team. McCoy noticed that the value of football
player draft picks varied dramatically relative to how high or low that player was picked
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in the overall draft. A first pick in round one of the NFL draft was paid an amount
equivalent to the combined value of the sixth pick and the eighth pick and more than that
of the final four picks of the first round combined (Moskowitz, Wertheim 175-192). In
fact two prominent behavioral economists, Richard Thaler of the University of Chicago
and Cade Massey at Yale, noted that historically the number one pick in the draft is
typically paid about 80% more than the eleventh pick in draft on the initial contract.
Thaler and Massey found that the inflated values teams were assigning to high picks were
remarkably consistent. The two economists then looked at whether these values were
justified after examining post draft player performance and results. They found that
higher picks are generally better than lower picks on average and the first round draft
picks on average post better numbers than do second round draft picks who in turn post
better stats than third round draft picks but that the stats also showed that top round draft
picks’ performance weren’t that much better than second or third round draft picks
relative to the salary differentials they were paid. Thaler and Massey concluded that the
probability that the first player drafted at a given position is better than the second player
drafted at the same position is only 53%, slightly better than a tie. The probability that
the first player drafted at a position is better than the third player drafted at the same
position is only 55%. The probability than the first player drafted at a position is better
than the fourth player drafted is only 56%. In other words, by selecting the consensus top
player at a specific position versus the consensus fourth best player at that position
increases performance, measured by the number of starts, by only 6%. Yet teams will
end up paying, in terms of both players and dollars, as much as four or five times more to
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get that first player relative to the fourth player.

In fact as a professional football team,

the smart strategy may be to trade your 1st round pick for a number of 2nd and 3rd round
picks despite getting plenty of flak from your fans (Thaler, Massey 35).
Figure 14
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COEXISTENCE OF THE FAVORITE & OPPOSITE FAVORITE LONGSHOT BIAS

Based on the academic research and the empirical data collected between 1990
and 2011, there seems to be evidence to indicate that the stock market displays similar
characteristics to prospect theory and the notion of loss aversion and that as a result, there
exists both a favorite long shot bias and an opposite favorite long shot bias in stock
markets.

As discussed earlier, prospect theory suggests that investors perceive a higher

level of negative utility from a given loss versus the positive utility from an equivalent
level of gain as show by the equation [+U] < [U-]. For our study, we’ll assume that U is
equivalent to a unit of earnings power from a company. As a result, investors will place a
greater value on avoiding U- by assigning a higher value to U+. This is natural as
companies perceived to have safer and more predictable earnings power get rewarded
through higher long term equity returns rather than companies perceived to have less
predictable “less safe” earnings power. This is based on the assumption that most
individual investors and asset managers are generally risk averse.
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How can we tie this idea of predictable earnings power back to the low volatility
anomaly? Behavioral studies suggest that investors are overconfident in their ability to
judge an outcome. Just as subjects in an experimental setting use representativeness and
ignore given probabilities when asked about whether a description fits a lawyer or a
doctor, investors will overestimate their confidence in the future prospects for a company
when those expectations are based on their own research, whether they use a company’s
products and services or whether that stock is held in their own portfolios. If an
investor’s family uses Apple Computer products at home, that investor may place greater
confidence in Apple’s future prospects based on a very small sample size. In addition,
empirical studies suggest that earnings volatility can have a significant impact on stock
market valuation that is ultimately a reflection of investor confidence.

This overconfidence gets reflected in higher stock price multiples for companies
with lower volatility and higher earnings predictability. In 2005, Graham et all surveyed
401 financial executives to determine the key factors that drive decisions related to
reported earnings and found a pronounced aversion to earnings volatility. In fact, 97% of
respondents express a preference for smooth earnings. In exploring the reasons for this
finding, 80% of the respondents stated that their aversion to volatility was due to their
belief that higher earnings volatility reduced future earnings predictability (Graham 373). According to a separate study conducted by Ronnie Barnes in 2001 after adjusting
for firm size, balance sheet leverage, current levels of profitability and the level of current
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investment and sales growth, there is a significantly negative relationship between the
market to book ratio and earnings volatility (defined as the coefficient of variation of
various earnings measures). This is consistent with the idea that less variance in
earnings should be desirable if one wants or needs more of a sure thing. In addition,
Barnes found a statistically significant relationship between firms in the 1st and 99th
percentiles of earnings volatility and their respect market to book value ratios. On
average, Barnes found that there is a 0.04 difference in market to book value ratios
between a firm whose earnings volatility is in the 5th percentile and one in the 95th
percentile while there is a 0.23 different in market to book value ratios (approximately
15% of the median) between firms in the 1st and 99th percentiles (Barnes 1-47).

This suggests that part of the low volatility anomaly can be explained by investors’
aversion to earnings volatility, similar to Kahneman and Tversky’s work around Prospect
Theory. Investors perceive earnings volatility similarly to how they perceive the
potential of realizing a loss on a gamble. Given that investors realize greater negative
utility from a given loss relative to the positive utility they realize from a given profit of a
similar magnitude, investors will place a premium on stocks with lower chances of losing
money relative to stocks with a higher chance of losing money. As a result, stocks with
lower earnings volatility can command a higher valuation by the stock market and
therefore outperform stocks with a similar level of earnings but with higher earnings
volatility. This may actually support the idea that the favorite long-shot bias and the
opposite favorite long shot bias existing and occurring at the same time. Importantly, this
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study also provides evidence supporting the notion of the favorite and opposite favorite
long shot bias in stock market. The empirical data used in this study showed that over the
past 22 years portfolios consisting of those companies with high quality fundamentals
measured by balance sheet leverage, returns on capital and consistent earnings
performance relative to analyst expectations generally outperformed portfolios consisting
of companies with lower quality fundamentals within the ten portfolios actually showed
some of the weakest performance in terms of stock price performance over the past 22
years. Interestingly, the two portfolios with the best and worst fundamentals
respectively measured by leverage and ROE actually showed relative poor performance
versus the 10 portfolios in aggregate. Figure 15 looks at return on equity in 1990 for the
325 companies that make-up the 10 portfolios in our sample and their respective returns
between 1990 and 2012. The portfolio consisting of those companies with the highest
ROEs and the portfolio consisting of those companies with the lowest ROEs ratios
generated 45.0% and 16.4% respectively while the 10 portfolios in aggregate generated
returns of 48.2% over the same time period.
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Figure 15: Source Factset

Figure 16 looks at debt/capital ratios for those same companies across the 10 portfolios in
our sample. The portfolio consisting of consisting of those companies with the lowest
and highest debt/capital ratios generated 38.7% and 13.2% returns respectively over the
22 years between 1990 and 2012, again below the average 48.2% for all ten portfolios
during the same time frame.
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Figure 16: Source Factset

The point here is that had an investor simply invested his or her money in those stocks
with the best fundamentals or the worst fundamentals in an attempt to generate outsized
returns, that investor would have underperformed the broader stock market. In order to
understand why, we need to look at the relative value placed upon companies with the
best and worst fundamentals across long term time horizons. Figures 17 and 18 look at
the average price-to-earnings ratios (P/E) for our sample portfolios sorted by lowest to
highest debt/capital ratios and highest to lowest returns on equity. As discussed earlier,
P/E ratios are essentially qualitative values determined by market participants and placed
on stocks to determine a companies’ stock price. Recall, a stock’s price is equivalent to a
companies’ earnings per share (EPS) multiplied by its P/E ratio. The figures below
suggest that companies with the lowest debt/capital ratio and the highest debt/capital ratio
trade at relatively high P/E ratios versus the 10 portfolios in aggregate. The portfolio
consisting of those companies with the lowest debt/capital ratio traded at an average P/E
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of 22x between 1990 and 2012 versus the average P/E ratio of 20x over the same time
frame for all 10 portfolios, a premium of 10% over the group average. Similarly, the
portfolio consisting of those companies with the highest debt/capital ratio traded at an
average P/E of 21.3x over the same time frame, a premium of 7% over the group average.
In other words, investors pay a high premium for companies with the best and worst
debt/capital ratios. In addition, figure 20 shows a similar analysis except looking at ROE
instead of debt/capital. Again, the portfolios of companies with the highest and lowest
ROEs over the past 22 years traded at an average P/E of 25.5x and 21.3x reflecting a
premium of 28% and 7% respectively.
Figure 17: Source Factset
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Figure 18: Source Factset
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While it may seem obvious that stocks with the best fundamentals would
command a higher premium versus those stocks with worse fundamentals, it seems
counterintuitive that stocks with the absolute worst fundamentals can actually trade at
relatively high valuations. This is mostly driven by expectations for earnings recovery
and the value investor mind-sight, sometimes referred to as contrarian investing. Value
investors often invest in companies with poor prospects that are generally out-of-favor
and “un-loved” by the crowd in hopes of a company’s fundamentals improving over time.
These contrarian investors can be analogous to long shot horseracing bettors placing bets
on horses with the lowest odds but highest payoffs. Thus, stocks with the worst
fundamental attributes actually command high valuations because investors perceive
large potential returns contingent upon an improvement in fundamentals.
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Our analysis of P/E ratios over the 22 year time frame between 1990 and 2012 relative to
performance, debt/capital ratios and ROEs suggests that investors actually seem to
perform poorly when investing in companies with extremely strong and extremely poor
underlying fundamentals. In other words, investors tend to over-bet companies with the
best fundamentals or the “sure-shots” and the worst fundamentals or the “long-shots”
simultaneously to the point where stocks in both “tails” generated the lowest overall
returns relative to stocks in the middle of the pack.

In a related study titled “Do Financial Markets Reward Buying or Selling
Insurance and Lottery Ticket?” Antti Ilmanen, managing director at AQR Capital
Management LLP suggested that selling financial investments with insurance or lottery
characteristics should earn positive long-term premiums if investors tend to overpay for
these characteristics. His premise was that all else being equal, investors prefer assets
that tend to generate positive absolute returns during volatile markets and thus make their
portfolios more positively skewed, in other words positive relative returns vis-à-vis the
market with similar or lower levels of volatility. Yet, since these assets are scarce,
investors will tend to pay a high price for this characteristic. Conversely, because
investors dislike negative skewness, in other words negative returns vis-à-vis the market
with similar or higher levels of volatility, they’ll require an extra reward or required risk
premium in order to hold such an asset. In this case, investors will tend to overly punish
or undervalue an asset relative to its true intrinsic value. Ilmanen goes on further to
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suggest that investors have nonstandard preferences in that small chances of very large
gains with almost certain but small expected losses can induce risk seeking while
investors become risk averse when a gamble involves small chance large impact losses
with almost certain small expected gains so much so that they pay for insurance to avoid
such losses. Citing work by Bordalo, Gennaioli and Shleifer (2010), Ilmanen suggests
that decision makers overweight the likelihood of salient states in which lotteries and
insurance payouts have extreme, contrasting payoffs. He concludes, based on his own
empirical research, that strategies that sell assets with insurance and lottery ticket like
characteristics have delivered positive long-run rewards in a wide range of investment
contexts. Conversely, buying financial catastrophe insurance and holding speculative
lottery-like investments have delivered poor long-run rewards (Ilmanen 9).

We can draw a similar analogy to stocks in the S&P500. Over the 22 years from
1990 to 2012, investors were poorly paid relative to the market by investing in safe
companies with near “bullet-proof” fundamentals and companies with extremely weak
fundamentals. This is because investors tend to be both risk averse and risk seeking in
terms of how they perceive certain stocks. Companies with high profitability and pristine
balance sheets are viewed insurance protection and vehicles for capital preservation.
Since these companies are few and rare, they tend to be over-valued as investors herd into
their stocks. Similarly, companies with low levels of profitability and weak balance
sheets are viewed as lottery tickets with potential for very large gains when the market is
trending up. Therefore, the stocks of companies exhibiting these characteristics will tend
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to become overvalued especially in a portfolio where investors can limit losses by taking
small positions similar to the payoff profiles of a lottery ticket. In fact, Ilmanen goes
further and suggests that given most investors have constraints and limits on how much
leverage they can assume behind an investment, investors will tend to use stocks with
lottery ticket like characteristics as a means of enhancing returns without the use of
leverage (Ilmanen 9).
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THE LONG SHOT & SURE SHOT BIAS EXPLAINED BY RATIONAL CHOICE

It is important to understand the critical arguments against behavioral economics.
Most importantly, behavioral economists challenge the main tenet of Rational Choice
theory namely that collectively, individuals will act rationally in terms of the decisions
they make based on the information they’ve been given with regard to choices at hand.
According to Mark Kelmon at Stanford University, rational choice theorists counter with
four main arguments vis-à-vis behavioral economists. First, rational choice theorists
claim that critics often misinterpret the ends that subjects in fact are seeking by
“observing” that they have failed to meet these ends. In other words, if a subject makes a
decision that seems irrational based on what we believe that subjects intent to have been,
in fact from the perspective of that subject his or ends may seem perfectly rational.
Second, rational choice theorists argue that while it may appear that agents are acting
irrationally, they are in fact processing incomplete information as well as it can be
processed. For example, if an investor makes an investment in a company and that
company issues a profit warning a week later sending the company’s stock down, rational
choice theorists posit that the investor didn’t make an irrational decision but that based on
the information at the time, he or she made a perfectly rational choice. Third, rational
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choice theorists suggest that while we may observe irrationality in particular settings, it
may not be stable over time since either institutional forces or individual learning will
overcome it over a long enough period of time. Finally, rational choice theorists claim
that if we observe behavior that does not meet the normative ideal of rational decisionmaking, no one can improve on that behavior (Kelmon 1577-1591).

Richard Posner,

Chief Judge on the U.S. Court of Appeals for the Seventh Circuit and Senior Lecturer at
the University of Chicago School of Law, suggests that not only does behavioral
economics fail to violate Rational Choice Theory but also it in fact complements the
theory.

According to Posner, behavioral economics suggests that due to the lack of

complete information and emotional “quirk”, people often make decisions based on
emotional preferences rather than rational preferences. For example, a person may
choose to eat a lobster contentedly so long as he or she has not seen the lobster alive
before eating it. On the other hand, that same person may refrain from eating lobster if
asked to pick his or her lobster from a live tank before eating it. Behavioral economics
would explain this as an emotional quirk but Posner suggest than an alternative
explanation is that this person simply has different preferences for two different goods:
One is a lobster seen only after being cooked and the other is a lobster seen before, in its
living state, as well as after. Similarly, our observation about the favorite and opposite
favorite long shot bias and the violation of CAPM in the stock market may in fact
constitute perfectly rational behavior based on difference investor preferences (Posner
24). For example, suppose a fund manager loses 15% of his assets due to poor
investments but outperforms his benchmark that declines by 30% at the same time. His
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client is hardly going to appreciate fewer losses but is more likely going to choose to pull
his money out of the stock market entirely to preserve capital. In addition, hedge fund
managers who are compensated based on absolute positive returns regardless of the
broader stock market are highly motivated to protect capital and avoid losses. In fact, a
manager will likely choose to avoid losses over taking outsized risk for large gains.
Similarly, a pension fund manager’s most important priority is preserving the value of his
clients’ pensions rather than trying to generate significant returns. Therefore, for most
money managers it might be perfectly rational to avoid losses at all costs rather than
“swinging for the fences” by over-investing in sure shot investments as a form of
insurance against losses while investing in long shot investments as a means of
generating lottery ticket like returns in order to keep up with meaningful up-market
movements. Similarly, a 65 year old retiree investing his retirement savings might have a
preference for avoiding losses significantly more than his preference for generating
outsized returns vis-à-vis the market while a 25 year old investor with a longer term
investment horizon is more willing to take risk given his retirement needs are not
necessary for 35 more years. These differences in preferences and risk tolerance might
actually be perfectly rational given difference market participants’ risk preferences.

This difference in preference suggests that collectively investors are both risk
averse and risk loving at the same time. According to Jan Zabojnik, there is
overwhelming evidence that in many situations individuals exhibit an aversion towards
uncertainty – homeowners buy insurance, investors need to be compensated for bearing
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risk, workers like stable employment and so on. On the other hand, in many cases people
appear to enjoy risk - they play the roulette wheel in casinos, buy sweepstakes, bet on
horses and under-diversify their investment portfolios. Zabojnik explains, “People seem
to have conflicting preferences with regard to risk.” In Principles of Economics, Alfred
Marshall 1920, Marshall states “…but on the other hand, if an occupation offers a few
extremely high prizes, its attractiveness is increased out of all proportion to their
aggregate wage.” Several explanations have been cited for this. First, individuals may
gain some “intangible” utility from the social aspects of gambling such as sitting around a
casino or poker table with friends enjoying a laugh or two or the thrill of watching horses
thunder around a racetrack at a horse track. This fails to explain why individuals choose
to play the lottery or play online poker where social interaction is minimal at best
(Zabojnik 274-285).

According to Russell Sobel and Travis Raines, rational expectations theories for
the favorite longshot-bias can be generally grouped into two categories: risk preference
theories and information-perception theories (Raines, Sobel 371-385). The first group of
theories attributes the bias to a preference for risking among gamblers. In 1958,
Friedman and Savage posited that consumers have a globally risk-averse utility function,
yet over the relevant range concerning gambling and betting, the utility function becomes
locally risk-loving. Friedman and Savage contend that the long-shot bias adheres to the
full rationality assumption or the expected utility framework to generate both risk-averse
and risk-seeking behavior by the same individual. Friedman and Savage proposed a
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utility function consisting of both concave and convex segments showing that an
individual with preferences described by such a utility function will accept some fair
lotteries and reject others. The Friedman Savage utility function implies that most
individuals derive greater utility from an increase in wealth but that up to a certain point,
their marginal utility from rising wealth begins to diminish and taper off, as illustrated by
the convex segments of the utility function. According to Friedman and Savage, in
Figure 19

between these to levels of wealth individuals go through a transition period where they
measure wealth relative to one another rather than on an absolute basis. At this point,
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individuals begin to derive greater utility for a given level of wealth and therefore
investors’ preference for risk skews towards more risk taking with assets
that have lottery like payoffs. According to Friedman and Savage, it’s this interplay
between individuals that are constantly in a state of risk averting and risk taking behavior
that leads to this phenomenon of the favorite and opposite favorite long-shot bias in stock
markets. In contrast to behavioral economists, Friedman and Savage argue that this is
perfectly rational in that as investor preference towards risk changes, so do their rational
response to taking risk (Friedman, Savage 279-304).

Another explanation using risk-preference theories to explain for the long-shot
and sure shot bias existing at the same time might be due to the presence of different
agents with different preferences and utility curves. For example, a long only pension
fund with an investment time horizon of 20-30 years and the goal of matching future plan
beneficiary liabilities with the pension funds’ assets might be more concerned with asset
stability and limiting downside risk rather than large returns or outperforming a
benchmark. In contrast, a hedge fund manager whose salary depends on one year
performance or perhaps quarter to quarter performance versus a benchmark might be
willing to take more risk and investment in long shots with the idea of making large
potential gains with his clients’ money. Downside protection may not be as important
both because that hedge fund can protect his downside risk through hedging strategies
such as options or given the fact that the manager is investing client assets rather than his
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own, he might be more disposed to upside returns and less concerned with downside
movements (Zabojnik 279).

Figure 20

The illustration above shows 3 different agents’ risk curves or preference for risk. Each
agent is listed as C1, C2 and C3. As shown, agent C1 has a much higher tolerance for
risk versus agent C3. In other words, agent C1 is willing to assume a lower level of
return for the same level of risk as both agents C2 and C3. Agent C3 is the least risk
averse and demands an exponentially greater rate of return for assume even a slightly
greater level of risk. The point here is that C1 may act as the agent betting on the long
shot while C3 is more likely to bet on the sure shot given his lower tolerance for taking
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risk. In fact, agent C3’s risk free return hurdle is higher than agent C1 from the start
suggesting that C3 won’t even begin taking risk until he has been guaranteed a minimum
level of return from the start.

Therefore, the co-existence of the long shot and sure shot

bias may just be function of different agents with different risk preference curves
engaging with market at the same time.

Unfortunately, recent studies conducted by Stephen LeRoy at the Federal Reserve
Bank of San Francisco suggests that even assuming a “normal” level of risk aversion
doesn’t explain the level of stock price volatility that exists in equity markets. According
to Stephen LeRoy’s work, although recent research has moved away from the efficient
capital markets assumption of “reasonable levels of risk aversion”, even after
incorporating risk aversion into formal models, “the degree of volatility seen in the real
world only seems implausibly high and does not satisfactorily explain the volatility of
stock price movements.” This observed volatility in stock prices appears to contradict
stock market efficiency and efficient market theorists. LeRoy notes Robert Shiller’s
work from 1981 on stock price movements relative to changes in corporate dividends
which suggests that stock price volatility is too high relative to the volatility in underlying
corporate dividends under the efficient market assumption that investors have a low level
of risk aversion (LeRoy 3). Shiller states that the assumption that stock prices should
equal expected future dividends independent of the volatility of dividends can be justified
only if investor risk aversion is excluded. If investors are risk averse, stock prices will
depend on how variable dividends are in addition to their expected levels. This sort of a
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measure of market efficiency implicitly treats investors as being risk neutral. According
to Shiller’s work, stock price volatility implied by a given dividend model depends on
how much information investors are assumed to have about future dividends. If investors
cannot predict future dividend growth, they will price stocks at a constant multiple of
current dividends and therefore the stock price volatility relative to dividend volatility
will be zero. On the other hand, if investors have information about future dividends,
then stock prices relative to dividends will vary over time. The more information about
dividend growth investors have, the greater the average price variation. Therefore, the
price volatility associated with perfect and complete information is the highest level of
volatility that can actually occur. In variance bound tests, Shiller and others found that
the observed price volatility appeared to exceed this maximum level based on complete
information thereby contradicting the efficient markets model even after eliminating the
assumption of risk neutrality. Shiller suggests that stocks as an asset class exhibit
volatility that is too high relative to the volatility of underlying dividends (Shiller 24).
Similarly, work conducted by Kevin Lansing and Stephen LeRoy in 2011 computed the
stock price volatility implied by different levels of risk aversion. Like Shiller, they found
that, under normal levels of risk aversion, predicted maximum stock price volatility is
actually much lower than what is actually seen in the market. They also found that the
higher the level of risk aversion, the higher the maximum stock price volatility.
Therefore, stocks still exhibit volatility that is too high relative to efficient market
predictive models even after making the assumption that investors are inherently risk
averse which stands in violation of the efficient market hypothesis (LeRoy, Lansing 2).
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A counter point to Shiller and LeRoy comes from the theory of rational
expectations with respect to information-perception, sometimes called misperception
theory, as a reason for why stock price volatility is so high relative to underlying dividend
volatility even after taking into account risk-averse investor behavior. The idea behind
misperception theory is that investors don’t have all of the available information needed
to accurately project a company’s future prospects. In other words, investors rationally
invest in stocks on expected outcomes that they believe are accurate based on the
information they’ve been given or that they’ve been able to collect. The information
given is either inaccurate or incomplete or both but in the end, investors make choices
based on misperceptions about expected future outcomes and projections. More often
than not, corporate executives and board members have information asymmetry as it
relates to product demand, new products and services, and changes in corporate strategy
such as acquisitions and divestments. This kind of information can often lead to dramatic
changes, positive or negative, for a company’s future prospects and therefore future
expectations relative to expectations today. Therefore, what may look like a long shot or
sure shot investment in hindsight might have looked like a very attractive investment, in
the case of the long shot, or a very poor investment, in the case of the sure shot, at that
time based on the information at hand. Finally, information-perception theories for the
long-shot and sure-shot bias also suggest that bettors do not perfectly absorb information.
In fact, Snowberg and Wolfers suggested, through studies conducted by cognitive
psychologists, people are systematically poor at discerning between small and tiny
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probabilities and similarly poor at discerning high and extremely likely probabilities.
Therefore, it is the representative bettor’s inability to process information correctly that
leads to a favorite and opposite favorite long-shot bias (Snowberg, Wofers 723-746).

The point here is that while difference in risk preference curves and marginal
utility of wealth can explain the long shot and sure shot bias in terms of rational investor
expectations, stock prices exhibit volatility that is too high relative to underlying dividend
and cash flow volatility. While investors are assumed to have a normal level of risk
aversion, data suggests that investors have a degree of risk aversion that is higher than
what can be explained by rational expectations. This may be a function of misperception
theory whereby investors are making rational choices but based on incorrect or
incomplete information. In this case, rational expectations theory is still relevant
although more research would need to be conducted into whether the lack of information
or incomplete information leads to overly optimistic or overly pessimistic future
projections. Overly optimistic projections from misperception can help explain the long
shot bias but not necessarily the sure shot bias. Similarly, overly pessimistic future
expectations based on misinformation and misperception can help explain the sure shot
bias but may not be helpful in explaining the long shot bias.
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CONCLUSION
The Capital Asset Pricing Model (CAPM) states that investments with greater risk
require greater returns from investors in order to compensate them for taking greater risk.
Therefore, under the premise that market participants act rationally and therefore markets
run efficiently, investments with higher risk should generate higher returns vis-à-vis
investments with lower risk over the long run. A plethora of academic research focused
on this particular topic suggests that the empirical data surrounding risk and returns
contradicts the conclusions of modern portfolio theory. In fact, many studies suggest that
investments with lower risk actually generate equal to or higher returns relative to
investments with higher risk.

In looking at data for the S&P 500 going back 22 years between 1990 and 2012, I
found that there was very low correlation between risk and returns. In fact, portfolios
with very low risk generated commensurate to better returns versus portfolios with very
high risk. In addition, in general portfolios that delivered higher returns with greater risk
did not generate high enough returns to compensate for greater risk. In other words, there
appears to be diminishing marginal returns with greater level of risk assumed by
investors. It seems that beta does a poor job of predicting future returns and measuring a
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company’s fundamental risk. Therefore, CAPM may be flawed in that beta does a poor
job in capturing a stock’s true underlying risks.

In looking for a better measure of risk, I looked at the fundamental characteristics
of each company, specifically corporate profitability and balance sheet leverage, which
are commonly used by investors in assessing the underlying quality of a company. I
found two important observations in looking at the empirical data. First, companies with
higher levels of average long term return on equity combined with lower levels of
average balance sheet leverage tend to outperform companies with lower levels of
profitability and higher balance sheet leverage. This shouldn’t be a big surprise.
Naturally, companies with better fundamentals should perform better than companies
with relatively worse fundamentals. Interestingly, the second observation from the data
is that while in general, companies with high ROEs and low leverage tend to outperform
companies with low profitability and high leverage, portfolios of those companies with
the highest ROE and lowest leverage and portfolios of those companies with the lowest
ROE and highest leverage actually underperform on the whole other portfolios. In other
words, portfolios of companies that exhibit the most extreme of characteristics in terms of
ROE and leverage underperform portfolios of companies with more moderate
characteristics.

One plausible explanation for this underperformance at the extremes is rooted in
behavioral economic theory known as the favorite long shot bias and the opposite
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favorite long shot bias. The opposite favorite long shot bias suggests that market
participants tend to “over-bet” an asset and/or an investment with high probability of a
payoff but low overall return if the payoff occurs, in other words, the sure winner or the
sure bet. In fact, market participants go so far to secure a payoff that they actually place a
higher bet on the probability of success than the actual odds would suggest. In stock
market terms, investors will tend to over-value the least-riskiest stocks to the point where
risk and return is no longer favorable. Similar phenomenon can be observed in horse race
betting and sports drafts. The favorite long shot bias is the inverse of the opposite
favorite longshot bias. This theory suggests that market participants actually “over bet”
an asset and/or an investment with the lowest probability of a payoff but with significant
overall returns if the payoff occurs. Similar phenomenon takes place in the purchase of
insurance to insure against large potential losses with small probabilities as well as lottery
ticket purchases. With respect to the stock market, this is similar to an investor
purchasing penny stocks or a high-flying company with an unproven track record with
the idea of making large potential returns but with a highly low likelihood of success.

On the other hand, rational expectations theory suggests that the existence of the
favorite longshot bias and the opposite favorite longshot bias existing at the same time is
actually perfectly rational and consistent with rational expectations theory. One of the
most of interesting explanations may be that investors are both risk loving and risk averse
at the same time depending on their relative marginal utility for wealth. In other words,
an investor investing $100,000 of his personal money in the stock market may choose to
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protect his invest from a loss at all costs, an extreme form of loss aversion, to the point
where that investor will over-bet low risk stocks and exhibit characteristics of the
opposite favorite long-shot bias. At the same time, if that same investor invests $1,000 of
his personal money in the stock market, he or she may choose to gamble and take bigger
risks investing in penny stocks and highly risky investments with the idea of accepting a
small loss for a significantly large payout. In other words, at a certain point along a
person’s marginal utility horizon, that investor will become risk loving or risk averse but
the fact is that this investor is making a perfectly rational choice but with different levels
of risk loving and risk averting behavior at different levels of investment. Additionally,
different agent with different risk preferences and marginal utility of wealth can influence
stock prices at the extremes. Pension investors, hedge funds, retail investors and long
only mutual fund managers all have different investment time horizon, different long
term and short term return expectations and therefore can have difference tolerances for
risk and risk preference in general. The point is that the rational expectations theory
suggests that the long shot and sure shot bias need not be an example of irrational
behavior but may in fact be perfectly rational.

Regardless of the cause for long shot and sure shot investing, we find that the
phenomenon of over-investing at the extremes does exist especially when looking at
fundamental factors such as ROE and debt/capital ratios in terms of measuring risk. We
find that beta, in fact, does a poor job of capturing a company’s fundamental risk and
hence future stock price returns relative to more fundamental analysis.
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